Introduction
On June 25, 2026, the Supreme Court reshaped the rules for seeking asylum at the border. In Mullin v. Al Otro Lado, No. 25–5, the Court held that a noncitizen standing in Mexico does not “arrive in the United States” simply by reaching a port of entry and asking to come in. Justice Alito wrote for a six-Justice majority, and the decision reverses the Ninth Circuit.
The stakes are concrete. The phrase “arrives in the United States” appears in two core provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and those provisions govern who must be inspected and who may apply for asylum. As a result, the meaning of that phrase decides when the right to request asylum at the border attaches. For practitioners, employers, and people fleeing persecution, the answer carries real consequences.
Background and Facts
Procedural History
The dispute began in 2017, when asylum seekers and the advocacy organization Al Otro Lado sued the federal government in the Southern District of California. They challenged a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) practice called “metering,” which capped daily processing at ports of entry. The District Court certified a class and granted summary judgment for that class in 2021.
Shortly afterward, the government rescinded the metering policy. Nevertheless, the court entered a declaratory judgment in 2022, finding the practice unlawful. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit then affirmed in relevant part. See Al Otro Lado v. Executive Office for Immigration Review, 138 F. 4th 1102 (2025). Finally, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and decided the case in June 2026.
Operative Facts
In 2016, CBP faced a surge of arrivals at southwestern ports of entry. At times, the number of people seeking entry exceeded what officers could safely process. In response, the Department of Homeland Security adopted metering in November 2016. Under that policy, officers stood on the U.S. side of the border and limited how many people could enter to be inspected each day.
Officers physically prevented asylum seekers from stepping across the line until capacity allowed. Two presidential administrations maintained the practice, and a third rescinded it in 2021 after the District Court ruled. The class members were noncitizens who sought asylum at the border but were turned back before setting foot on U.S. soil.
Legal Issue
The Court had to answer one question. Does a noncitizen who seeks to enter from Mexico “arrive in the United States” under 8 U.S.C. §1158(a)(1) and §1225(a)(1) while still standing in Mexico, or only after crossing the border? In other words, does the right to seek asylum at the border attach at the threshold, or upon entry?
Legal Authority and Binding Status
Two INA provisions control. Section 1225(a)(1) deems a person an “applicant for admission” once he “arrives in the United States,” and §1225(a)(3) requires inspection of applicants for admission. Section 1158(a)(1), in turn, allows any noncitizen who “arrives in the United States” or who “is physically present” to apply for asylum. Together, these provisions determine who may seek asylum at the border and who must be inspected. Congress adopted both phrases in their current form through the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).
This decision is binding nationwide. A Supreme Court ruling interpreting a federal statute sets the controlling rule for every federal court and agency. Accordingly, it supersedes the Ninth Circuit’s contrary construction and resolves the question for future cases. The holding is also broad rather than fact-specific, because it fixes the meaning of statutory text rather than weighing unique facts.
Court’s Reasoning
The majority started with ordinary meaning. To “arrive” means to reach a destination, and “in” means within the bounds of a place. Therefore, a person arrives in a location when he enters it, not before. The Court reasoned that blocking someone at the threshold does not change that result. It offered familiar examples, noting that a running back does not reach the end zone at the one-yard line, and a guest does not arrive in a house while still outside a locked door.
Next, the Court turned to statutory context. Other INA provisions expressly address “attempts” to enter, yet §§1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1) do not. Citing Keene Corp. v. United States, the majority treated that omission as deliberate. Moreover, Congress referred elsewhere to aliens “arriving . . . near a land border,” and it once allowed asylum for those “at a land border or port of entry.” When IIRIRA replaced that older phrase with “arrives in the United States,” the Court presumed a real change in meaning.
The respondents leaned on the rule against surplusage. They argued that “arrives in” becomes redundant if it requires the same physical presence already covered by “physically present.” The Court acknowledged some force to this point. However, it explained that the anti-surplusage canon is not absolute, and that Congress sometimes enacts overlapping language. Here, the overlap is only partial. The majority concluded that the “arrives in” language was added to align asylum eligibility with the expedited-removal process created in 1996.
Finally, the Court invoked the presumption against extraterritoriality. Nothing in the text clearly extends these provisions beyond U.S. territory. Because the respondents’ reading would tie inspection and asylum at the border to conduct on the Mexican side, the Court declined to adopt it. The majority also rejected a treaty argument, relying on Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, which held that the nonrefoulement duty in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention does not govern a nation’s conduct toward people outside its territory.
Justice Thomas concurred. He questioned whether the District Court’s relief violated 8 U.S.C. §1252(f)(1), which limits class-wide injunctions against the operation of §1225. Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. She argued that statutory context, decades of agency regulations, and the law’s history all show that “arriving” covers those in the process of arriving, regardless of foot placement. Justice Jackson dissented separately, contending that the case was effectively moot because metering had not operated for years.
Holding and Key Takeaways
The Court’s answer was direct. A noncitizen standing in Mexico does not “arrive in the United States” by attempting, and failing, to set foot in the country. Instead, arrival occurs only upon crossing the border. Consequently, the INA neither requires inspection of such a person nor entitles that person to apply for asylum at the border.
This changes the prior landscape in the Ninth Circuit, where the panel had read the statute to protect noncitizens stopped at the threshold. The ruling reaches every noncitizen who presents at a land border or port of entry without first crossing. It also validates metering as a lawful tool, at least insofar as the practice delays entry rather than permanently bars it. The Court did, however, leave open how courts might treat a future policy designed to block all arrivals indefinitely.
Practical Immigration Implications
Practical Effects for Asylum at the Border
The most immediate effect concerns timing. Under this decision, the statutory right to seek asylum at the border does not attach until a noncitizen physically enters the United States. As a result, officers may lawfully limit entry at ports of entry through metering. People who are turned back before crossing cannot compel inspection under §1225 or an asylum referral under §1158.
Strategy therefore shifts. Counsel advising clients on asylum at the border should account for the possibility of delayed entry and document each attempt to present at a port of entry. For those already inside the country, the “physically present” pathway under §1158(a)(1) remains available, subject to the one-year filing deadline and other bars. Withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture also remain available to people in removal proceedings.
Several open questions persist. The Court did not address whether a total-blockade policy would survive review, and it left §1252(f)(1) issues for another day. In addition, the dissent warned that the ruling could push some people toward unlawful crossings between ports of entry, which carry criminal exposure under §1325(a) and bars to relief. Practitioners should monitor agency guidance, because the agency may adjust port-of-entry procedures in response to the decision. For context, see our coverage of DHS’s response to recent Supreme Court rulings on immigration enforcement.
How Immigration Professional Association Can Assist
Immigration Professional Association helps individuals and families pursue asylum and related protection in light of this decision. Our attorneys prepare and file affirmative asylum applications and represent clients through credible-fear interviews and the expedited-removal and asylum process. We also assist with Form I-589 preparation, supporting evidence, and one-year-deadline issues. For those evaluating how to present a claim, our guide to applying for asylum at the U.S.–Mexico border walks through eligibility and procedure in practical terms.
Because timing now drives outcomes, early planning is essential. This ruling confirms that the right to apply for asylum attaches only after entry, so people who reach a port of entry should understand their options before they travel.
In short, Mullin v. Al Otro Lado confirms that seeking asylum at the border now depends on physically entering the United States. Because metering may delay entry and procedures may change, affected individuals and families should act promptly and seek tailored advice. To discuss your options with an experienced immigration attorney, contact Immigration Professional Association.
