Case Overview in Matter of FORJOE
- Case name: Matter of Francis Jude Forjoe, Respondent
- Deciding authority: Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Department of Justice
- Decision date: February 26, 2026
- Immigration category involved: Removal proceedings; fraud/misrepresentation; waiver of removability under INA 237(a)(1)(H); waiver of inadmissibility under INA 212(i); adjustment of status and naturalization consequences
The BIA dismissed the respondent’s appeal, held that the phrase “at the time of admission” in INA 237(a)(1)(H) refers only to lawful entry after inspection at the border, explicitly overruled Matter of Agour, and affirmed the denial of both a 237(a)(1)(H) fraud waiver and a 212(i) extreme hardship waiver, as well as the denial of a motion to terminate based on a defective notice to appear.
Key Facts in Matter of FORJOE
Background and parties
The respondent, Francis Jude Forjoe, is a native and citizen of Ghana. He was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant in 1995. In 2002, he entered into a fraudulent marriage with a U.S. citizen, “Emma,” who filed a Form I‑130, Petition for Alien Relative, on his behalf with USCIS.
Immigration history
While married to Emma, the respondent began a relationship with “Christy,” also from Ghana, and they had two children in 2004 and 2007. At a 2007 USCIS interview on Emma’s petition, the respondent did not disclose that he had fathered two children outside the marriage. USCIS approved Emma’s I‑130 and granted his application for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident (LPR) on July 17, 2007; he later divorced Emma and married Christy.
In 2012, he applied for naturalization and admitted at the interview that he was the father of the previously undisclosed children; USCIS denied naturalization, and DHS initiated removal proceedings in 2013.
Chronology of material events in Matter of FORJOE
- 1995 – Admission to the U.S. as a nonimmigrant.
- 2002 – Fraudulent marriage to U.S. citizen Emma and filing of I‑130.
- 2004 and 2007 – Births of children with Christy.
- July 17, 2007 – Adjustment of status to LPR based on Emma’s petition after non‑disclosure of children.
- 2012 – Naturalization application; admission of paternity of two children; application denied.
- 2013 – DHS initiates removal proceedings, charging removability under INA 237(a)(1)(A) based on fraud under INA 212(a)(6)(C)(i).
- 2015 – Respondent concedes removability; pleadings close.
- September 20, 2021 – Immigration Judge (IJ) denies motion to terminate, 237(a)(1)(H) waiver, and 212(i) waiver/adjustment.
- 2026 – BIA issues precedential decision dismissing appeal and overruling Matter of Agour.
Procedural History in Matter of FORJOE
Filings and adjudications before the immigration judge
DHS charged the respondent as removable under INA 237(a)(1)(A), as an alien who was inadmissible at the time of entry or adjustment for having procured a visa or other benefit by fraud or willful misrepresentation under INA 212(a)(6)(C)(i).
The respondent conceded removability in 2015. As relief, he sought (1) a waiver of removability for misrepresentation under INA 237(a)(1)(H); (2) adjustment of status based on an approved I‑130 filed by Christy, now a naturalized U.S. citizen; (3) A waiver of inadmissibility under INA 212(i) via Form I‑601; (4) he also filed a motion to terminate removal proceedings based on a notice to appear (NTA) that lacked date and time information.
Immigration judge’s decision
The judge denied the motion to terminate, finding the NTA objection untimely. Also, judge found the respondent not credible due to misrepresentations about Christy’s relationship with the children, the timing of cohabitation, and his failure to disclose the children during Emma’s petitions, as well as implausible testimony regarding his ability to support himself in Ghana.
The immigration judge found him statutorily eligible for a 237(a)(1)(H) waiver under Matter of Agour but denied it as a matter of discretion. The judge also denied the 212(i) waiver and, consequently, denied adjustment of status, concluding he failed to show “extreme hardship” to a qualifying relative.
Appeal to the BIA and supplemental briefing
The respondent timely appealed the IJ’s decision. The BIA requested supplemental briefing on whether the Board had properly construed “admission” in INA 237(a)(1)(H) to include adjustment of status in Matter of Agour. Both parties submitted supplemental briefs.
Jurisdictional posture
The case arises in the jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The BIA exercised appellate jurisdiction over the IJ’s decision and designated Matter of Forjoe as a published, precedential decision.
Legal Issues Presented in Matter of FORJOE
- Whether a respondent may obtain termination of removal proceedings based on an NTA that lacks date and time information when the objection was raised after the close of pleadings.
- Whether the phrase “at the time of admission” in INA 237(a)(1)(H) includes adjustment of status, such that fraud or misrepresentation at adjustment can be waived under this provision.
- Whether the respondent merited a 237(a)(1)(H) waiver in the exercise of discretion.
- Whether the respondent established “extreme hardship” to a qualifying relative sufficient to warrant a waiver of inadmissibility under INA 212(i).
Legal Reasoning and Analysis in Matter of FORJOE
Motion to Terminate—Defective NTA
The respondent argued that the proceedings should be terminated because his NTA lacked the date and time required by INA 239(a)(1)(G)(i).
The BIA reviewed the legal issue de novo under 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(d)(3)(ii). Citing Matter of Fernandes, the Board reiterated that INA 239(a)(1) is a claims‑processing rule, not jurisdictional, and that objections to noncompliant NTAs must be raised before the close of pleadings to be timely.
Because the respondent filed his motion to terminate in August 2021, long after pleadings closed in 2015, the Board held that his objection was untimely, and Fernandes, applied retroactively under Matter of Larios‑Gutierrez de Pablo, foreclosed termination.
Interpretation of INA 237(a)(1)(H): “At the Time of Admission”
The Board framed the interpretive question as whether “admission” in 237(a)(1)(H) includes adjustment of status, as previously held in Matter of Agour.
It began with the plain language of the statute, noting that INA 101(a)(13)(A) defines “admission” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” The BIA reasoned that the phrase “at the time of admission” thus naturally refers to the moment of lawful entry, not an internal procedural adjustment without a physical entry. Applying standard canons, the Board emphasized that clear statutory language must be given effect unless doing so would produce results “demonstrably at odds” with congressional intent, and it did not find such an exception here.
Legislative history and statutory evolution
The Board traced the history of deportability grounds and fraud waivers. BIA concluded that the shift from “entry” to “admission” in 237(a)(1)(H) was a conforming amendment associated with the broader definitional change in IIRIRA, not a substantive expansion of the waiver to cover adjustment fraud.
It noted that Congress “left untouched” the text of 237(a)(1)(A), which expressly covers inadmissibility “at the time of entry or adjustment of status,” while choosing not to include “adjustment of status” in 237(a)(1)(H). Applying the Russello presumption, the Board held that Congress’ use of different language in closely related provisions indicated a deliberate decision to limit 237(a)(1)(H) to admission‑related fraud at physical entry.
Pre‑IIRIRA case law and Board precedent
The decision highlighted that this Board and multiple circuits, including the Sixth Circuit, historically treated the pre‑IIRIRA predecessor (241(f)) as not covering fraud committed at adjustment of status, only fraud at entry. It cited decisions such as Ferrante (Sixth Circuit), Pereira‑Barreira (Second Circuit), Khadjenouri (Ninth Circuit), and Matter of Connelly, all limiting the waiver to entry‑time misrepresentations.
The Board rejected the idea that IIRIRA implicitly expanded the waiver’s scope by substituting the defined term “admission,” reasoning that Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes” by making major changes via conforming amendments.
Treatment of adjustment as “admission” in other contexts
The BIA acknowledged its past holdings, treating adjustment as an “admission” in specific contexts to avoid absurd results. However, it concluded those functional interpretations do not justify overriding the clear language in 237(a)(1)(H), which by definition and context refers to entry after inspection.
The Board emphasized that limiting 237(a)(1)(H) to entry fraud does not produce “bizarre or absurd consequences” and had been the prevailing interpretation for many years.
Overruling Matter of Agour and prospective application
The Board explicitly overruled Matter of Agour’s holding that adjustment of status constitutes an “admission” for 237(a)(1)(H) purposes.
Applying its retroactivity test (from Matter of Cordero‑Garcia), the BIA considered five factors and found that the decision represents an abrupt departure from a longstanding published precedent. Parties could reasonably have relied on Agour’s broader interpretation. The burden of retroactively applying the new rule would be significant and would upset settled expectations. The Board concluded that statutory interests did not outweigh reliance on Agour and therefore limited its new interpretation of “admission” to prospective application.
Because the respondent’s case arose under the Agour regime, the Board evaluated his 237(a)(1)(H) waiver on discretionary grounds, assuming statutory eligibility.
Discretionary Analysis—237(a)(1)(H) Waiver
The BIA reiterated that a 237(a)(1)(H) waiver is discretionary and requires balancing the respondent’s undesirability against social and humane equities, citing Matter of M‑C‑C‑ and Matter of Tijam.
The IJ found, and the BIA affirmed, that the respondent’s misrepresentations were material because they shut off a line of inquiry that would likely have led to denial of benefits. Favorable factors included over 30 years of residence in the U.S., U.S. citizen children and family ties, and long-term employment and tax payment history.
The BIA agreed with the IJ that the weight of adverse factors, particularly the prolonged and repeated fraud and misrepresentations, diminished the value of respondent’s equities and did not support a favorable exercise of discretion.
212(i) Waiver—Extreme Hardship
The respondent sought a 212(i) waiver of inadmissibility for fraud/misrepresentation based on asserted extreme hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse, Christy.
He argued that: Christy had previously been in an abusive relationship and relies on him for emotional and psychological support. If she and the children accompanied him to Ghana, they would face financial hardship and difficulty adjusting culturally and economically.
The Board reviewed the extreme hardship determination de novo and applied the general principle that economic detriment, reduced standard of living, separation from a family member, and cultural adjustment, while relevant, usually do not alone constitute “extreme hardship,” citing Matter of Pilch.
The IJ found, and the BIA agreed, that both the respondent and Christy earned significant salaries at a well‑known financial company. The respondent would be eligible for Social Security upon retirement and owned a mortgaged home. Christy and the children were not dependent on his employment for health insurance, as she could obtain coverage independently through their employer.
The BIA acknowledged the real emotional hardship but characterized such hardship as “common” in removal cases and insufficient, on this record, to meet the statutory “extreme hardship” threshold. Hardship to children was not a qualifying factor under 212(i), except insofar as it affected hardship to Christy; the Board found the cumulative evidence still fell short of extreme hardship. Consequently, the Board affirmed denial of the 212(i) waiver and, following INS v. Bagamasbad, declined to reach alternative adjustment eligibility issues because the lack of a waiver was dispositive.
Practical Implications after Matter of FORJOE
For respondents and family‑based immigrants
- Scope of 237(a)(1)(H) narrowed prospectively: Going forward, the BIA’s precedential holding limits 237(a)(1)(H) fraud waivers to misrepresentations at the time of lawful entry after inspection, excluding fraud committed solely at adjustment of status.
- Adjustment‑related fraud will generally need to be addressed through inadmissibility waivers (such as 212(i) or others), not 237(a)(1)(H), even in removal proceedings.
- Forjoes’s case confirms that long residence, U.S. citizen family, and employment do not automatically offset a prolonged pattern of fraud; discretionary weighing can still result in denial.
For petitioners and employers
- Employers and petitioning family members should be aware that misrepresentations at any stage—particularly failure to disclose relationships or children—can later trigger removability and bar relief, even after years of lawful employment and tax compliance.
- Documentary consistency (marital history, children, cohabitation, financial assets) is critical; inconsistent or incomplete information can undermine credibility before the IJ and BIA.
Documentation and compliance considerations after Matter of FORJOE
- For 237(a)(1)(H) (where still applicable prospectively for entry fraud):
- Evidence should include clear proof of qualifying relationships (spouse, parent, child) and that the respondent was “otherwise admissible” at the time of entry but for the fraud.
- Practitioners should expect close scrutiny of whether additional grounds of inadmissibility existed at entry, which may not be waivable under 237(a)(1)(H).
- For 212(i) waivers:
- Evidence must persuasively demonstrate hardship “unusual or beyond” that typically associated with removal, using detailed medical, psychological, economic, and country‑conditions documentation where relevant.
- Financial independence of the qualifying relative will often undercut hardship claims unless combined with unique vulnerabilities or compelling individualized factors.
Risk mitigation
- Clients should be counseled early—ideally before filing for adjustment or naturalization—about the consequences of nondisclosure or misstatement of family relationships and prior immigration history.
- Where prior fraud is known or suspected, strategic evaluation of available waivers (237(a)(1)(H), 212(i), 212(h), unlawful presence waivers) and the timing of applications is essential, particularly given the prospective limitation of 237(a)(1)(H) announced in this case.
How can an immigration lawyer from the Immigration Professional Association help?
An immigration lawyer from the Immigration Professional Association can carefully review a client’s full immigration and family history to identify any past misrepresentations and assess eligibility for waivers such as INA 237(a)(1)(H) and 212(i). Counsel can explain how the BIA’s decision in Matter of Forjoe narrows the fraud waiver for those inadmissible “at the time of admission” and evaluate whether a client’s conduct occurred at entry, at adjustment of status, or in connection with another benefit.
Our attorney can assemble thorough evidence of qualifying relationships and hardship, including financial records, medical or psychological reports, and country‑conditions materials, to meet the demanding “extreme hardship” standard. Lawyers can also prepare clients for testimony, address credibility concerns, and present a balanced equities case where discretionary relief is available. For employers and family petitioners, counsel can provide compliance‑focused guidance on accurate and consistent filings to reduce the risk that future benefits are denied or revoked due to alleged fraud. In removal proceedings, an experienced attorney can pursue appropriate motions, waivers, and appeals consistent with the evolving precedential framework reflected in this decision.
