Background
On January 21, 2026, The Associated Press reported about the memo that authorizes ICE officers to use force to enter a residence based solely on a more narrow administrative warrant to arrest someone with a final order of removal. This memo raised the concern of whether ICE can Enter House Without a Judicial Warrant. The memo was issued by Acting ICE Director Todd Lyons on May 12, 2025. The whistleblowers assert that this is a flagrant violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Later that day, JD Vance, during a White House briefing, told the press that his “…understanding is that you can enforce the immigration laws of the country under an administrative order”.
In this article we will analyze the legality of presented questions: whether Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents can constitutionally enter a private residence to arrest an individual subject to a final order of removal using only an administrative warrant (Form I-205), rather than a judicial warrant signed by a judge.
Scope of the May 12 Memo
The discussed memo states that ICE can enter a house without a judicial warrant and outlines the following framework of its applicability:
- Officials may conduct an arrest under Form I-205 only in the arrestee’s place of residence. The memo stated that ICE officers cannot effectuate an arrest in a 3rd-party residence without consent, exigency, or a judicial warrant to enter a 3rd-party residence.
- It is not applicable in the Central District of California because in Kidd v. Mayorkas, 734 F.Supp.3d 967 (C.D. Cal. 2024) court ruled that a judicial warrant is required to enter a home or curtilage to make an arrest.
- The memo outlines general exceptions to Fourth Amendment warrant requirements: consent, search incident to arrest, plain view, and exigent circumstances. They are not covered in this article.
What is Form I-205?
The May 12 Memo refers to Form I-205 as a prerequisite for ICE to enter a house without a judicial warrant. Form I-205 is a “Warrant for Removal/Deportation”. This administrative arrest warrant (ICE Warrant) may be issued by various authorities defined in 8 CFR § 241.2, including an immigration judge in exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings; a designated official; the Board of Immigration Appeals; or a United States District or Magistrate Court Judge.
It is worth noting that Form I-205 is different from Form I-200, “Warrant for Arrest of Alien”. The principal difference between ICE Form I-200 (Warrant for Arrest of Alien) and Form I-205 (Warrant of Removal/Deportation) lies in their timing and prerequisites under immigration law: the I-200 authorizes the arrest of an allegedly deportable noncitizen without a final removal order, pursuant to 8 CFR § 241.2 and INA § 236, while the I-205 issues only after a final order of removal by an immigration judge, BIA, or federal court, per 8 CFR § 241.2(a) and INA § 241(a).
Legal Nature of Form I-205
Form I-205, sometimes also called “administrative warrant” or Blackie’s Warrant (after the 1981 case Blackie’s House of Beef v. Castillo) is traditionally viewed as a non-judicial warrant, meaning it is issued and signed by executive branch DHS/ICE officials, such as Field Office Directors or their designees under 8 CFR § 241.2(a)(1), rather than by a neutral Article III [of the Constitution] judge or magistrate with independent probable cause review for Fourth Amendment purposes.
The earlier 2007 ICE policy confirms the determination that the warrant of removal is administrative in nature
and does not grant the same authority to enter dwellings as a judicially approved search or arrest warrant.
Fourth Amendment Law Regarding ICE Entering House Without a Judicial Warrant
As the Supreme Court reiterated in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), it is a “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law” that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. It has always been clear based on Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) what kind of warrant courts are referring to:
An arrest warrant issued by a magistrate upon a showing that probable cause exists to believe that the subject of the warrant has committed an offense, and thus the warrant primarily serves to protect an individual from an unreasonable seizure.
Courts consistently mandate that a warrant for searching a residence must be based on a judicial assessment of probable cause. This requirement ensures protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Opposite View on Whether ICE Can Enter House Without a Judicial Warrant
The Supreme Court has not explicitly determined if administrative arrest warrants for immigration enforcement meet the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirements. This lack of a direct ruling leaves the constitutionality of such warrants open to interpretation.
The closest relevant decision is Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960). In Abel v. United States, the Supreme Court considered whether Abel’s arrest under an administrative Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) warrant was lawful despite a parallel FBI espionage investigation, and whether the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were violated by the search and seizure of evidence while he was in custody. The Court, in a narrow 5–4 ruling, determined that the INS arrest was legitimate and not merely a guise for criminal enforcement. Additionally, it ruled that the evidence obtained by the INS and subsequently utilized by the FBI was constitutionally permissible.
Even though the Court has not relied on Abel since 1996, lower courts routinely rely on this case language to uphold the constitutionality of administrative arrest warrants issued by immigration enforcement officers, even when the warrants do not meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment:
- United States v. Malagerio, 49 F.4th 911 (5th Cir. 2022), upheld the denial of a motion to suppress, ruling that ICE agents did not violate the Fourth Amendment when arresting a noncitizen at his trailer based on an administrative warrant. The court found the arrest occurred in a public place (doorway/driveway) rather than inside the home and deemed the search consensual.
- City of El Cenizo, Texas v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018), court rejected the facial challenge, holding plaintiffs failed to show every application of the mandate violates the Fourth Amendment. It distinguished criminal from civil immigration context, noting the Constitution does not require probable cause of criminality for immigration detentions; civil probable cause (reasonable grounds to believe removability) suffices
Conclusion and Practical Guidance if ICE Enters House Without a Judicial Warrant
The Supreme Court has not resolved this constitutional question. Fourth Amendment doctrine, historical practice, and recent district court rulings favor requiring a judicial warrant for home arrests. Administrative immigration forms alone are generally insufficient absent consent or exigent circumstances.
Noncitizens and families may unintentionally waive constitutional rights by misunderstanding these legal distinctions. For attorneys and advocates, misidentifying the warrant type or arrest location can defeat suppression, civil, or defensive claims.
IMMIGRATION PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION provides accurate, neutral, court-defensible guidance grounded in statutes, constitutional doctrine, and evolving case law.
