Case Overview
The case In Matter of Gholam Ghanbari addresses a significant issue in immigration law. In this precedential decision, the BIA (Board of Immigration Appeals) sustained the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) bond grant. This decision determined that the respondent provided material support to the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), an undesignated terrorist organization. As a result, he was subject to mandatory detention without bond during removal proceedings.
Key Facts in Matter of Gholam Ghanbari
The respondent, a native and citizen of Iran, stated in his refugee application that he was a sympathizer of the MEK from 1980 to 1987 and engaged in propaganda activities. On June 28, 1981, Iranian authorities searched his home and discovered MEK-related papers, leaflets, and books. They detained him for involvement in “mojahidins’ activities.” He was imprisoned twice, and a family member was also associated with the MEK.
The MEK participated in the 1979 Iranian Revolution, supported the U.S. Embassy takeover in Tehran, and opposed the release of American hostages. In the early 1980s, the group conducted attacks against the Islamic Republic of Iran. These attacks included a 1981 bombing that killed Iran’s chief justice and dozens of officials. The respondent was approximately 15 to 16 years old during his initial involvement. DHS provided information from the Congressional Research Service. This information detailed the MEK’s terrorist activities during this period.
Procedural History in Matter of Gholam Ghanbari
The IJ in Matter of Gholam Ghanbari conducted a custody redetermination hearing under INA section 236(a) on July 10, 2025. This happened after finding the respondent not subject to mandatory detention under INA section 236(c). In an August 7, 2025, bond memorandum, the IJ determined DHS was substantially unlikely to prevail on a removability charge under INA section 237(a)(4)(B) for material support to a terrorist organization. The IJ concluded the respondent was neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk and granted bond.
DHS appealed the IJ’s decision. The BIA panel, consisting of Appellate Immigration Judges Goodwin, Hunsucker, and Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge McCloskey, reviewed the appeal. On October 10, 2025, the BIA issued its decision. This was designated as precedent by the Attorney General on December 19, 2025, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3). DHS’s request for a transcribed bond hearing was denied.
Legal Issues Presented in Matter of Gholam Ghanbari
The primary issue was whether the respondent met his burden under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(ii). This was to demonstrate that DHS was substantially unlikely to establish a charge of removability under INA section 237(a)(4)(B). He needed to show he provided material support to an undesignated terrorist organization, thereby avoiding mandatory detention under INA section 236(c)(1)(D).
Key statutes and regulations at issue included:
- INA section 237(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (defining removability for engaging in terrorist activity, including material support to a terrorist organization).
- INA section 236(c)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(D) (requiring mandatory detention for aliens removable under security-related grounds).
- 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(D) (limiting IJ jurisdiction over custody redeterminations for aliens subject to mandatory detention).
Decision Summary
The BIA sustained DHS’s appeal, vacated the IJ’s July 10, 2025, custody decision, and ordered the respondent detained without bond. The BIA held that the respondent failed to prove he was not properly subject to mandatory detention. Evidence showed he provided material support to the MEK, making him removable under INA section 237(a)(4)(B) and detainable under INA section 236(c)(1)(D). Thus, the IJ lacked jurisdiction to grant bond.
Legal Reasoning and Analysis
The BIA reviewed the IJ’s decision de novo. The focus was on whether the respondent established that DHS was substantially unlikely to prevail on the terrorism-related removability charge. Under Matter of Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 1999), and Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the respondent bore the burden to show he was not included in a mandatory detention category. This required “very substantial grounds” to override DHS’s position before merits adjudication.
The BIA cited Matter of Kotliar, 24 I&N Dec. 124 (BIA 2007), noting that formal charging with the removability ground is not required for mandatory detention to apply. Evidence from the respondent’s refugee application—admitting sympathy for the MEK and propaganda activities—supported DHS’s position. The BIA referenced Congressional Research Service reports confirming the MEK’s terrorist acts, including the 1979 Embassy takeover and 1981 bombings.
Relying on Hosseini v. Nielsen, 911 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2018)—binding in the jurisdiction—the BIA noted that the MEK operated as a terrorist organization from the 1970s through at least September 1981. Distributing flyers constitutes material support by lending legitimacy to the group. The BIA rejected the IJ’s finding that the support was immaterial due to the respondent’s age (15–16) and lack of knowledge. They pointed to his application’s references to accusations of “mojahidins’ activities,” imprisonments, and family ties. Unlike Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 2004), where the alien testified to unawareness and disassociation, the respondent provided no testimony or evidence of ignorance or disassociation from the MEK’s violence.
The BIA concluded the evidence provided substantial grounds for DHS to prevail, thus mandating detention without IJ jurisdiction for redetermination.
Practical Implications
For foreign nationals with past affiliations to groups later deemed terrorist organizations, this decision underscores the need for thorough documentation in applications. This includes evidence of unawareness or disassociation from violent activities. Petitioners and employers sponsoring individuals with refugee or asylum histories should conduct detailed background reviews. This is to anticipate terrorism bars during adjustment or removal proceedings.
In bond hearings, respondents challenging mandatory detention must present affirmative evidence rebutting DHS’s claims. Mere youth or lack of direct violence involvement may not suffice. Compliance teams should advise clients on the broad interpretation of “material support,” which includes non-violent propaganda. This can help to mitigate risks of detention or removability.
Policy and Compliance Considerations
This decision aligns with longstanding DHS policy on terrorism-related inadmissibility grounds. It emphasizes a broad definition of material support under INA section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). Communications or propaganda benefiting terrorist organizations fall under this definition. It signals heightened scrutiny of historical affiliations with groups like the MEK, even if delisted (MEK was delisted in 2012). It reinforces that undesignated organizations can trigger bars if they meet the terrorist activity definition.
Future adjudications may see increased evidentiary demands in bond proceedings, particularly for youthful involvement, without departure from existing standards. No changes in overall policy are indicated, but it highlights the precedential weight of Sixth Circuit interpretations in similar cases.
Key Takeaways
- Past propaganda activities, such as distributing leaflets, can constitute material support to a terrorist organization. This triggers mandatory detention under INA section 236(c).
- Respondents bear a heavy burden to show DHS is substantially unlikely to prevail on terrorism-related removability charges in bond hearings.
- Youthful involvement (e.g., ages 15–16) does not automatically render support immaterial without evidence of unawareness or disassociation.
- Circuit precedent, like Hosseini v. Nielsen, influences BIA interpretations of terrorist organizations and material support.
- Undesignated groups like the MEK can invoke terrorism bars based on historical activities, even post-delisting.
- This precedential decision reinforces broad application of security grounds in removal proceedings.
